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 It is widely acknowledged that perspective taking is fundamental to the 
development of the self, the development of the individual’s ability to interact 
meaningfully with other people, and to the successful functioning of society. Attempts 
to articulate the mechanisms underlying perspective taking have relied upon internal 
cognitive mechanisms; the child can imitate (or internally simulate) the perspective of 
others by virtue of identifying with the other or internalising the perspective of the 
other. However, as Martin argues, any explanation relying solely upon cognitive 
mechanisms is unsatisfying and potentially circular: it assumes, as an internal ability, 
that which the theory is meant to explain. A satisfactory explanation must have recourse 
to social interaction, either to the interaction context in which the innate ability was 
selected for, or to the social interactions that extend these innate, but very rudimentary 
abilities, into elaborate forms of perspective taking. To this end, Martin makes two 
contributions: firstly, he uses Mead to identify one type of social interaction that may be 
particularly important for the development of perspective taking, and secondly, he 
proposes a program of research that will differentiate this theory from alternative 
theories. I will expand upon each of these contributions in turn, firstly drawing out 
“position exchange” as a novel dimension of social interaction, and secondly, 
illustrating why Martin’s suggested research should study the children’s game of hide-
and-seek. 
 
Perspectives and Social Positions 
Fundamental to the Meadian theory that Martin is developing is a distinction 
between perspectives and social positions. Perspectives, as described by Martin, refer to 
the relation between an actor and the environment. This relation is carved, primarily, by 
action. Action is the meeting point between the embodied desires of the actor and the 
constraints of the environment. The environment, from the perspective of the actor, 
contains paths of action leading to the satisfaction of various desires. The problem of 
perspective taking, then, is the problem of how children become aware of the action 
orientations of others. 
Social positions, which are given less attention by Martin, are functional 
positions within institutionalised patterns of interaction, or, what Mead (1925; Gillespie, 
2005) calls “social acts.” Examples of social positions within everyday social acts 
include: speaking/listening, buying/selling, winning/losing, giving/receiving, 
requesting/helping, attacking/defending, leading/following, questioning/answering, 
lending/borrowing, and commanding/obeying. Social positions also exist in play: 
children enjoy enacting the social positions of buying and selling, of feeding (usually a 
doll) and being fed, of giving and receiving, of chasing and escaping, of teaching and 
learning, and so on. 
In order to use this distinction between perspectives and social positions to 
understand perspective taking, two assumptions must be made. Firstly, each social 
position, given its social and structural configuration of affordances and constraints, 
sustains a perspective. The social position patterns the occupant’s experience. Being, for 
example, in the social position of receiving can sustain experiences of joy, indebtedness 
and even resentfulness. The complementary social position of giving, on the other hand, 
can sustain experiences of loss, vicarious joy, and superiority, amongst others. 
Secondly, people frequently exchange social positions within social acts. Sometimes 
people give and sometimes they receive; sometimes people command and at other times 
they obey; sometimes people buy and sometimes they sell, and so on. Children, when 
playing, change social positions with particular frequency.  
So, given these two assumptions, how does perspective taking develop? Taking 
the perspective of the other needs to be theorised alongside “taking the social position 
of the other.” When the child, during position exchange, takes the social position of the 
other, the child cultivates the perspective of the other because each social position 
sustains a distinct perspective. Ontogenetically, then, the form of perspective taking is 
not perspective taking as such, but is simply taking up and enacting the social position 
of the other. Through taking the social position of many others, in play and actuality, 
the child cultivates the diverse perspectives that are sustained by social and institutional 
structures. The child becomes, in an embodied sense, a buyer and a seller, a care-giver 
and a cared-for, a teacher and a learner, a doctor and a patient, and so on. Thus the 
Cartesian gulf is bridged; all children within the same society and moving between the 
same social positions will cultivate a similar matrix of perspectives. However, it 
remains to be explained how a child integrates the correct complementary perspectives 
so that when in one social position the child is aware of the perspective of the other 
(without being in the social position of the other). The key mechanism is again position 
exchange within a social act. Consider the social act of giving/receiving. In the course 
of development children move between the social positions of giving and receiving 
innumerable times. Indeed, sometimes young children and their caregivers play at 
simply giving and receiving things. Repeatedly and rapidly moving from the social 
position (and thus the perspective) of the recipient to the social position (and the 
associated perspective) of the giver could, potentially, differentiate and integrate the 
perspectives of the giver and receiver. Having thus integrated these two differentiated 
perspectives, the child is able to take the perspective of the receiver while being in the 
social position of the giver and vice versa (Gillespie, 2005). 
In the foregoing review I have tried to emphasise “position exchange” because it 
is both fundamental to Mead’s theory, and because it can make a significant 
contribution to the literature by highlighting a new social dimension. Traditionally “the 
social” has been theorised in terms of social interaction without position exchange. In 
Piaget’s (1932) work on the development of morality, the focus is on symmetrical and 
asymmetrical interactions, but in both cases the social position of the child is fixed. 
Vygotsky (1987, chapter 6) posited that adults and more advanced peers create a zone 
of proximal development around the child’s activities which “scaffolds” development. 
That is to say that the adults do something to the child, but the child never changes 
social position with the adults. More recent work on “guided participation” (Rogoff, 
2003, chapter 8) emphasises the role of cultural tools, such as language, to bridge 
divergent perspectives and  thus enables adults and more advanced peers to structure the 
experiences of the child. However, again, the child’s position within the interaction 
remains fixed; the child’s attempts to guide the participation of a doll, or of an even less 
adept child, are outside the theoretical frame. According to Mead it is position exchange 
within social acts that “scaffolds” perspective taking, not the actions or utterances of the 
other per se. 
Hobson (2002), who comes very close to a Meadian approach, also misses the 
potential link between position exchange and perspective taking. Both Hobson and 
Mead conceive of development as being a gradual process that is irreducibly both social 
and biological. Both accept the existence of innate, rudimentary structures of 
intersubjectivity, and both accept the outcome of development to be the child’s ability 
to entertain two perspectives at once (Hobson, 2002, p.109; Gillespie, 2005). Moreover, 
both posit triadic relations between self, other, and object as the motor of this 
development. The difference between Hobson and Mead hinges upon the dynamics 
which occur within this triangle. 
Awareness may dawn gradually. The infant has repeated experiences of the 
triangle. Each time, the process of identification exerts its pull towards the 
position of the other. And, each time, the child's experience of the world shifts as 
a result of the pull. (Hobson, 2002, p.108) 
Notice that within these triadic dynamics, as described by Hobson, the position of the 
child is fixed. The child comes to appreciate the perspective of the other through the 
cognitive process of identification; while the child’s body stays in the same corner of 
the triad, the child’s mind learns to wander. In Mead’s account, however, first the 
child’s body moves, by position exchange, cultivating, differentiating, and integrating 
complementary perspectives, and only after this integration, is the child able to take the 
perspective of the other without taking the social position of the other. The difference 
between Mead and Hobson, then, is the difference between a covert and cognitive 
process of identification on the one hand and the overt and social process of position 
exchange on the other. 
To summarize, then, social theories of development have tended to focus upon 
what happens between the child and the other: Is the interaction symmetrical or 
asymmetrical? Does the other facilitate the child’s participation? Does the other 
structure the child’s experiences? Does the other mediate the child’s relation to the 
object? Does the child identify with the other? Across these questions the social position 
of the child remains constant and the distinction between the child’s perspective and the 
social position that the child happens to occupy is not theorised. However, observational 
studies of children at play reveals that position exchange is widespread. The 
significance of Mead’s theory is that it makes visible a new social dimension, enabling 
us to ask a new question: Does the child ever occupy the social position of the other? 
From a Meadian perspective repetitive position exchange within social acts is the motor 
that facilitates both the differentiation of perspectives and the integration of 
perspectives, such that the child can come to participate in two different perspectives at 
the same time. 
Position Exchange Within Children’s Games 
Martin’s second contribution, in keeping with his pragmatist theoretical 
framework, is to tease out the empirical consequences of Mead’s theory, and 
differentiate it from the alternatives, by proposing a program of naturalistic and 
experimental research. The context for the proposed research is the social act of feeding. 
The social positions within this act are those of feeding and being fed. In the naturalistic 
research, these caregiver-child interactions would be video-taped, and analysed for 
instances of perspective taking and position exchange, and the relation between these 
two processes would be traced as it develops. The experimental intervention would have 
three conditions: a control group, a scaffolding group (interaction with a more 
experienced peer), and a position exchange group. In the case of feeding, the control 
group would have normal feeding interaction, with the social positions relatively fixed, 
the scaffolding group would have an adult facilitating their activity, and the children in 
the position exchange group would sometimes be in the position of feeding and 
sometimes be in the position of being fed. By comparing perspective taking within these 
three groups the research could tease apart the differential contributions of position-
exchange and scaffolding in perspective taking. 
In terms of design, this brief outline is powerful. However, I suggest that the 
social act of feeding is not an ideal context for the research. Firstly, it is not necessary 
for the child to take the perspective of the mother in order to be fed successfully. This 
may make it hard to find instances of perspective taking to analyse. Secondly, 
introducing scaffolding will be difficult because it is unclear exactly what activity will 
be facilitated by the adult. Thirdly, position exchange does not commonly occur in 
naturalistic feeding interactions, which consequently will create problems for the 
naturalistic observation of position exchange because there may be too few instances. 
Finally, because position exchange rarely occurs in feeding interactions, the 
experimental introduction of position exchange will be somewhat artificial.  
Such artificiality can be avoided, however, because children spontaneously 
engage in numerous acts of position exchange. Indeed, there are many social acts 
incorporating position exchange that are peculiar to children. Children commonly play 
dolls, mums and dads, school, hospitals, shopping and a variety of games (Opie & Opie, 
1969). One game that seems particularly suited to exploring Mead’s theory is the 
popular game of hide-and-seek, which prototypically involves someone hiding and 
someone seeking. The history of this game goes back at least to the Ancient Greeks 
(Opie & Opie, 1969) and the game appears to have been independently invented in 
various cultures (Pandya, 1992). In all cases, two social positions and thus two 
perspectives can be clearly identified. As it is commonly played in the UK, the seeker 
closes her eyes giving the hider time to hide, and then the seeker shouts out that she is 
beginning to search for the hider. Each social position entails a different action 
orientation (i.e., a different perspective). The seeker does not know where the hider is 
and has the interest of finding the hider. The hider usually knows where the seeker is, 
and has the interest of remaining concealed. Because the seeker does not have any 
interest in concealing herself from the hider, the seeker often addresses and even taunts 
the hider, but the hider, having the interest of remaining hidden, must not reply to these 
taunts or else she will give away her location. Not only does the game of hide-and-seek 
contain and structure different perspectives, but more interestingly, it also entails 
repeated position exchange as the players repeatedly move between the social positions 
of hider and seeker.  
Peskin and Adrino (2003, p.506) report the errors that three and four year olds 
make when teaching a confederate how to play hide-and-seek. Theoretically, two types 
of error can be distinguished. Firstly, children fail to differentiate the perspectives of 
hider and seeker. For example, they might assign both themselves and the confederate 
to the same social position (i.e., they would seek together despite the fact that nobody 
was hidden); they might tell the confederate where to hide; and/or, they tell the 
confederate where they themselves were going to hide. Secondly, sometimes the 
children do not manage to regulate their actions within one social position from the 
perspective of the complementary social position. For example: they begin to hide 
before the confederate has looked away; they simply fail to conceal themselves 
properly; and/or they do not manage to remain concealed.  
The game of hide-and-seek thus clearly contains the key elements of Mead’s 
theory. To be a successful participant, the child must firstly differentiate the two social 
positions with their respective perspectives and secondly integrate these perspectives so 
that she can regulate activity within one social position with respect to the 
complementary perspective. Moreover, a central feature of the game is that the child 
repeatedly moves between the social positions of hider and seeker. Thus one can ask: Is 
the child, while searching for a place to hide, learning to search for a place that she 
would not think of seeking? And is the child, while seeking, searching for places that 
she herself would think of hiding? The game of hide-and-seek clearly operationalizes 
the main aspects of Mead’s theory, thus avoiding the need for artificial manipulations.  
Hide-and-seek is also ideally suited to longitudinal research focusing upon 
processes (Valsiner & Connolly, 2003) because it is a social institution that has many 
levels of complexity and can thus support the development of perspective taking 
throughout child development. At the most basic level of complexity are games like 
peek-a-boo, where the child and carer take turns in concealing and revealing their faces 
to each other (Bruner & Sherwood, 1975). From peek-a-boo the child can move onto 
the most basic forms of hide-and-seek which in turn leads on to numerous complexities 
like playing in the dark, hiding objects instead of bodies, and allowing the hiders to 
move around. More complex games which entail similar social positions include: kiss 
chase, cops-and-robbers, and treasure hunting. Raising the level of complexity still 
further, it is possible that narrative structures, which often involve hiding/seeking or 
escaping/chasing social positions, may further enrich the evolving architecture of 
intersubjectivity; further differentiating and integrating the perspectives. Dramatic films, 
for example, often have narratives that swivel upon the dynamics of escaping and 
chasing. In order to be able to follow such narratives the viewer must alternate between 
taking the perspective of the hider and the seeker. At this level of complexity, the child 
no longer takes the actual social position of either hiding or seeking, but merely has her 
own experiences of hiding and seeking re-organised, elaborated, differentiated, and 
integrated by the narrative. Thus, in hide-and-seek we find a social institution that 
facilitates development over the course of many years, and which increases in 
complexity as the child develops. Longitudinal research questions could thus focus on 
the incremental differentiation and integration of perspectives within this social act 
starting from a very basic level up to quite high levels of complexity. One could 
compare children who engage in frequent position exchange with those who do not. Or, 
one could introduce experimental interventions, as suggested by Martin. In any case, the 
social act of hide-and-seek offers more clear opportunities for operationalizing Mead’s 
theory within a longitudinal design. 
People have different perspectives because they occupy different positions in 
space and time (Farr & Rommetveit, 1995). This difference, however, is augmented by 
social institutions that channel us in divergent directions, situating us in diverse social 
positions, each with its own matrix of constraints and affordances. Yet relatively stable 
social institutions may also be the bridge enabling us to traverse the Cartesian gulf of 
divergent perspectives. Relatively stable social institutions, supporting relatively stable 
social positions, and people exchanging positions within these institutions, is the basis 
upon which these diverse perspectives are partially shared and coordinated. Hide-and-
seek, I suggest, illustrates this clearly. The game creates a divergence of perspective 
between the hider and the seeker, yet the game also, by virtue of fostering position 
exchange, provides the means to integrate these divergent perspectives such that 
children can learn to take the perspective of the other without being in the social 
position of the other. 
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